Global Energy Outlook 2015

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About the authors

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About this paper


About the Duke University Energy Initiative

The Duke University Energy Initiative (energy.duke.edu) is a university-wide interdisciplinary collaboration focused on advancing an accessible, affordable, reliable, and clean energy system. The Initiative reaches across business, engineering, environment, law, policy, and the arts and sciences to educate tomorrow’s energy innovators, develop new solutions through research, and improve energy decisions by engaging business and government leaders.

About the International Energy Forum

The International Energy Forum (IEF) (ief.org) aims to foster greater mutual understanding and awareness of common energy interests among its members. Covering all six continents and accounting for around 90% of global supply and demand for oil and gas, the IEF is unique in that it comprises not only consuming and producing countries of the IEA and OPEC, but also Transit States and major players outside of their memberships. The IEF is the neutral facilitator of informal, open, informed and continuing global energy dialogue.
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Richard G. Newell*, Yifei Qian, and Daniel Raimi

Abstract

This paper assesses trends in the global energy sector through 2040 by harmonizing multiple projections issued by private, government, and inter-governmental organizations based on methods from “Global Energy Outlooks Comparison: Methods and Challenges” (Newell and Qian 2015), developed in collaboration with the International Energy Forum. These projections agree that global energy consumption growth in the coming 25 years is likely to be substantial, with the global demand center shifting from Europe and North America to Asia, led by China and India. Most projections show energy demand growing as much or more in absolute terms to 2040 than previous multi-decade periods, although the rate of growth will be slower in percentage terms. Total consumption of fossil fuels grows under most projections, with natural gas gaining market share relative to coal and oil. The North American unconventional gas surge has expanded to tight oil more rapidly than anticipated, with implications for global oil markets that are still unfolding. Renewable electricity sources are also set to expand rapidly, while the prospects for nuclear power are more regionally varied. Global carbon dioxide emissions continue to rise under most projections and, unless additional climate policies are adopted, are more consistent with an expected rise in average global temperature of close to 3°C or more, than international goals of 2°C or less.

Key Words: global energy projections, forecast, demand, supply, oil, gas, coal, nuclear, renewables, natural gas, energy efficiency, carbon emissions, OPEC, unconventional oil and gas, energy security

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1. Report summary

Because of its massive scale and long-lived capital stock, the energy system tends to change slowly. However, recent years have seen faster-than-expected shifts on several key fronts, including oil supply and prices, demand for coal, and the deployment of renewable electricity technologies. We begin by briefly describing some of these recent developments, then note several major trends currently underway that appear likely to continue.

1.1 Major shifts in the energy landscape

Global energy markets have undergone substantial changes in recent years. First, unconventional oil and gas production has grown in North America more rapidly than most analyses had projected. This growth has dramatically affected North American natural gas supply and prices, and more recently has contributed to the 2014 collapse in global oil prices. Other factors, such as OPEC nations’ decision to increase production, and weaker-than-anticipated demand from developing nations such as China, have also contributed to the decline in oil prices from more than $100 per barrel in mid-2014 to less than $50 through most of 2015. These low prices have forced companies to slow investment in high-cost prospects such as deepwater, oil sands, or in the arctic, and nations heavily dependent on oil export revenues such as Nigeria, Venezuela, and Russia are facing fiscal challenges, potentially increasing political instability.

Second, costs for renewable electricity, led by wind and solar, have fallen more quickly than expected, making them cost-competitive with other fuel sources in some regions. While their deployment has grown rapidly, wind and solar still provide a very small share of the world’s electricity. Most projections show these sources continuing to expand quickly, with further cost reductions and policy support from governments both contributing.

Third, the focus on a new global agreement for reducing greenhouse gas emissions culminated in late 2015 with agreement among almost all countries on a “bottom-up, pledge-and-review” approach. Most major emitters, including the United States, China, India, and European nations have now pledged to reduce or slow the growth rate of greenhouse gas emissions, representing the most inclusive global climate agreement to date.

Finally, energy demand growth in China in 2014 was far more modest than most projections had anticipated. Despite reported GDP growth of more than seven percent, energy demand grew by roughly two percent from 2013 to 2014, and coal consumption remained roughly constant (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2015). If accurate, this slowed growth rate will have occurred years before projections had anticipated, substantially easing global energy demand in the coming decades.
1.2 **Continuing trends in energy**

While important shifts in the energy landscape have occurred in recent years, several key trends have continued apace or accelerated. First, global energy demand continues to grow rapidly. Most projections show energy demand growing in absolute terms to 2040 as much or more than it has over previous multi-decade periods, although the rate of growth will be slower in percentage terms. Consumption of all fossil fuels grows under most projections, with coal, oil, and natural gas providing 70 percent or more of total primary energy in 2040 under all projections evaluated here except the IEA 450 scenario, where the fossil share declines to 59 percent in 2040. Note that the share of fossil fuels is larger in outlooks that exclude non-marketed energy. For example, the IEA estimates the fossil fuel share was 82 percent in 2012, while BP estimates it was 90 percent.

Second, global energy demand continues to shift eastward. Although China’s energy consumption growth slows in all projections, India, Indonesia, and other Southeast Asian nations drive continued demand growth in the region. Energy trade flows will continue to shift eastward, as coal and oil imports grow in Asia while North America becomes a net energy exporter. Europe continues to be a net energy importer, while all other regions, led by the Middle East, provide growing shares of global energy supplies.

Finally, carbon dioxide (CO₂) emissions continue to grow under most projections. Developed economies in North America, Europe, and elsewhere generally see their CO₂ emissions decline, remain roughly flat, or grow very slowly. Developing economies, led by Asia, contribute all net growth in CO₂ emissions under most projections. National policies and international climate agreements have the potential to alter this trajectory, but at current levels of stringency are more consistent with an expected rise in average global temperature of close to 3°C or more, than international goals of 2°C or less.

2. **Sources and methodology**

2.1 **Projections and scenarios**

Energy outlooks play an important role in helping understand how the global energy system may evolve by providing detailed quantitative estimates of future energy consumption patterns, supply sources, technological trends, carbon dioxide emissions, and more. A number of organizations issue such outlooks on a regular basis, helping to inform energy producers, consumers, policymakers, and other stakeholders. These organizations include the International Energy Agency (IEA), the U.S. Energy Information Administration (U.S. EIA), the Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OPEC), and major energy companies such as BP, ExxonMobil, and Shell. In this paper, we examine projections from the following publications:


These outlooks vary due to a variety of factors, including distinct modeling techniques, different historical data, varying economic growth assumptions, and a variety of policy scenarios. Generally, policy scenarios can be grouped into three categories: (1) business-as-usual scenarios, which assume no major policy changes; (2) “best guess” scenarios, which incorporate the modeling team’s expectations of policy trends; and (3) alternative scenarios, which are typically based on certain policy targets or technology assumptions (Newell & Iler, 2013). Each of these approaches are represented in the outlooks we examine, summarized in Table 1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outlook</th>
<th>Projection period</th>
<th>Scenario</th>
<th>Description of scenario</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IEA WEO 2014</td>
<td>2012-2040</td>
<td>Current Policies</td>
<td>No new policies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IEA WEO 2014</td>
<td>2012-2040</td>
<td>New Policies</td>
<td>Includes existing and announced policies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IEA WEO 2014</td>
<td>2012-2040</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>Policies enacted to limit GHG concentrations to 450ppm CO₂e by 2100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ExxonMobil 2015</td>
<td>2010-2040</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>Carbon cost in OECD and other major emerging economies such as China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BP Energy Outlook 2015</td>
<td>2013-2035</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>BP’s best guess of policy development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EIA IEO 2013</td>
<td>2010-2040</td>
<td>Reference Case</td>
<td>No new policies; incorporates policies that have been enacted, assumes some future policy changes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPEC WOO 2014</td>
<td>2010-2040</td>
<td>Reference Case</td>
<td>No new policies; incorporates policies that have been enacted, assumes some future policy changes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shell New Lens Scenarios</td>
<td>2010-2060</td>
<td>Mountains</td>
<td>Heightened inequality and limited social mobility lead to slower growth; natural gas becomes the “backbone” of the global energy system; CCS gains success.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shell New Lens Scenarios</td>
<td>2010-2060</td>
<td>Oceans</td>
<td>Developing economies continue to grow rapidly; policies do not adequately price externalities; global energy demand strains supply; natural gas development is more limited.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: ExxonMobil and BP outlooks each provide one untitled scenario.
2.2 Harmonization

Different scenarios and modeling assumptions can produce informative variations between outlooks, allowing analysts to view a wide range of potential energy futures. However, outlooks also have a variety of important methodological differences, which can make direct comparison between outlooks challenging and complicate a reader's ability to draw insights.

One key difference between outlooks is assumptions about the energy content of fossil fuels. Some outlooks present original fossil fuels data in fuel-specific physical units, such as million barrels of oil-equivalent per day (mboed), metric tonnes of coal-equivalent (mtce) and trillion cubic feet (tcf) of natural gas, while others present data directly in energy units such as quadrillion \(10^{15}\) British thermal units (qBtu), million tonnes of oil equivalent (mtoe), or exajoules (EJ).\(^1\) Different assumptions about the energy content of fuels result in different conversion factors between data presented in energy units from those presented in physical units. Among the outlooks we examine, these assumptions can vary by 2 to 12 percent. While these differences in conversion units may appear small, they can produce significant differences when applied across the massive scale of global energy systems, and particularly over multi-decade time horizons. Another important difference results from varying decisions over whether to include non-marketed biomass such as wood or dung in historical data and projections. The inclusion of these fuels can yield a 10 to 14 percent difference in global primary energy consumption. Other differences in outlooks include, but are not limited to: (1) different definitions of primary energy consumption from non-combustible fuels such as nuclear and non-biomass renewables; (2) different categorizations for liquids fuels and renewable energy; and (3) different regional groupings for presenting aggregated data and projections.

To address these challenges, Newell and Qian (2015) developed a harmonization process to allow for more accurate comparison across outlooks. We apply that harmonization process here.

3. Evaluating previous projections: Expect the unexpected

Energy projections are inherently uncertain. Despite their imperfections, and in some cases because of them, an analysis of multiple forward-looking projections can provide insight into the range of possibilities facing tomorrow’s energy producers and consumers. While this paper focuses on the future, retrospective analysis of previous energy projections can also yield lessons by revealing unanticipated trends or “black swan” events. We discuss below two areas where past

\(^1\) We employ the following factors for converting other primary energy units to qBtu: 0.03968 qBtu/mtoe; 0.9478 qBtu/exajoule; and 1.976 qBtu/mboed.
projections deviated substantially from eventual reality: unconventional U.S. oil and gas production, and total energy consumption in China and the United States, the two largest energy consumers.

### 3.1 Evolving U.S. unconventional oil and gas projections

Throughout the mid- to late-2000s, the U.S. EIA, IEA, and ExxonMobil projected natural gas production in the United States to remain roughly flat while consumption grew. As a result, projections showed prices steadily rising and imports growing substantially.

However, technological advancements and experimentation led to a breakthrough in economically producing natural gas from shale and other tight formations, surprising most forecasters, policymakers, and even most major energy companies. The diffusion of these technologies to shale plays in Texas, Louisiana, Pennsylvania, and other states has led to a rapid rise in U.S. natural gas production. Around the same time, the “great recession” weakened demand across the economy, creating a glut of natural gas and a collapse in prices. Despite these low prices, natural gas production has continued to rise, and today’s projections show natural gas production growing far more rapidly than previous forecasts (see Figure 1).

![Figure 1: United States dry natural gas production and U.S. EIA projections](image)

The unconventional gas revolution has affected not only domestic producers and consumers, but also international markets. Liquefied natural gas (LNG) supplies originally destined for North American import terminals have turned elsewhere for buyers, and LNG export terminals are currently under construction in the United States, further increasing global LNG supply, lowering global LNG prices and speeding the decline of oil-linked natural gas contracts. The first of these LNG liquefaction and export facilities, located in Sabine Pass, Louisiana, is scheduled to begin production in early 2016.

Along similar lines, oil production in the United States since 2010 has grown far more rapidly than projected (see Figure 2), with major global consequences. Due to the application of the same types of technologies that made shale gas profitable, production of light tight oil (LTO) from the Bakken/Three Forks, Eagle Ford, Permian, and other plays has driven U.S. oil production to levels not seen since the mid-1980s. This surge in LTO, the decision of OPEC nations not to restrain production, and lower-than-expected demand drove global benchmark oil prices down by more than 50 percent from about $100 per barrel in mid-2014 to $50 per barrel by the start of 2015, and then to about $30 per barrel by early 2016. This crash in oil prices is having large implications for global petroleum consumers, energy investment decision-makers, and governments.

![Figure 2: United States crude oil production and U.S. EIA projections](image)

3.2 Evolving energy consumption projections for major countries

Trends in regional energy consumption growth vary based on multiple factors, including economic structure and growth, technological development, and a variety of policies. These factors change over time, often in ways that analysts find difficult to predict. One example is the upward revision of forecasts for global energy consumption (Figure 3), with worldwide projections pushed steadily higher as Asian economies grew more rapidly than expected over the previous twenty years.

A second example is the underestimate of China’s energy consumption growth. Moderate and steady growth was projected during the mid-1990s, but demand skyrocketed as China’s economy grew at rates of 10 percent or greater over much of the following 15 years. As a result, Chinese energy consumption in 2010 was roughly twice the level projected by the U.S. EIA in 1995. As Figure 4 shows, the U.S. EIA’s 2013 projection far exceeds the levels projected just three years earlier. Interestingly, recent experience and changes in the structure of Chinese economic growth suggest more recent projections probably overestimate China’s future energy consumption growth.

For the United States, the story is just the opposite. Forecasts from the mid-2000s tended to overestimate economic growth and underestimate efficiency gains. As a result, projections for future energy consumption in the United States have been revised downward since 2005 (Figure 5).

Figure 3: World primary energy consumption and U.S. EIA projections

Figure 4: China primary energy consumption and U.S. EIA projections


Figure 5: U.S. primary energy consumption and U.S. EIA projections

4. World primary energy consumption

This section focuses on primary energy consumption, including long-term trends, major drivers of primary energy demand growth, and regional variations. Figure 6 and Table 2 show historical global primary energy consumption patterns and a range of projections through 2040, measured in both qBtu and mboed. Table 3 provides data for primary energy consumption by fuel for 2012, the historical year used as the baseline for projections in most of the outlooks considered here. Global primary energy consumption is projected to grow by 20 to 60 percent between 2010 and 2040, a substantially slower percentage growth rate than 1950 to 1980 (171 percent) or 1980 to 2010 (79 percent). The projected annual growth rate is in the range of 0.6 to 1.6 percent per year, in contrast to 2.0 percent from 1980 to 2010 and 3.4 percent from 1950 to 1980. This slowdown in the rate of global energy demand growth is largely attributable to two factors: increased energy efficiency and a structural shift towards less energy-intensive economic development. In addition, China and other major emerging economies are projected to grow more slowly than in the past two decades.

In absolute terms, however, projected energy demand growth of 109 to 300 quadrillion Btu (qBtu) is in the same range as previous thirty-year periods, 1950 to 1980 (181 qBtu) and 1980 to 2010 (225 qBtu). Under business-as-usual scenarios such as the IEA Current Policies Scenario and the U.S. EIA Reference Case, absolute energy demand grows more than previous 30-year periods, increasing by 284 to 300 qBtu from 2010 to 2040.

Figure 6: World primary energy consumption continues to grow, but at a slower rate

Notes: BP and U.S. EIA projections do not include traditional, non-marketed biomass energy.
Different policy assumptions produce major differences in future energy projections. On the low end of energy consumption projections is the IEA 450 Scenario (620 qBtu in 2040), which assumes limited energy consumption growth, enhanced energy efficiency, and increased deployment of low- or zero-carbon energy sources, consistent with an estimated mean global temperature increase of 2°C in 2100. ExxonMobil assumes a substantial cost on carbon emissions in most OECD nations and certain major developing nations, and its GDP growth assumptions are substantially lower than other outlooks. Nonetheless, primary energy consumption in 2040 is similar in the ExxonMobil outlook (717 qBtu) and the IEA New Policies Scenario (726 qBtu). Shell’s Oceans Scenario, which assumes vigorous economic growth underpinned by high population growth and various policy reforms, shows the most bullish demand projection in 2040 (811 qBtu). Energy consumption in Shell’s Oceans Scenario is 209 qBtu higher than the IEA’s 450 Scenario, roughly equivalent to global energy consumption in 1970.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year/Scenarios</th>
<th>Quadrillion Btu</th>
<th>mboed</th>
<th>Avg. annual growth (%)</th>
<th>Total growth (%)</th>
<th>Absolute growth (qBtu)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1950 (incl. non-marketed energy)</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980 (incl. non-marketed energy)</td>
<td>286</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
<td>171%</td>
<td>181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010 (incl. non-marketed energy)</td>
<td>511</td>
<td>259</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2040</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IEA Current Policies</td>
<td>795</td>
<td>402</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>284</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IEA New Policies</td>
<td>726</td>
<td>367</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IEA 450</td>
<td>620</td>
<td>314</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ExxonMobil</td>
<td>717</td>
<td>363</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPEC</td>
<td>810</td>
<td>410</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>299</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shell Mountains</td>
<td>780</td>
<td>395</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>268</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shell Oceans</td>
<td>811</td>
<td>411</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010 (only marketed energy)</td>
<td>452</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2035 BP</td>
<td>636</td>
<td>322</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2040 U.S. EIA Reference Case</td>
<td>698</td>
<td>353</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>247</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Notes: The conversion rate is 0.51 mboed/qBtu, based on 7.33 boe/toe and 0.03968 qBtu/mtoe. Fuel-specific energy consumption figures from each source were converted to primary energy in qBtu using a consistent set of rules to ensure comparability across sources; details available in Newell and Qian (2015).

2 ExxonMobil assumes most OECD nations will impose a CO₂ cost of $30, $60, and $80/tonne by 2020, 2030, and 2040 respectively; major non-OECD emerging economies like China will have a CO₂ cost after 2030, ranging from $35 to $40/tonne by 2040; while less developed regions will impose negligible carbon costs during the projection period.
Energy consumption can be understood as the combination of three factors: population, GDP per-capita, and energy intensity of the economy (i.e., energy used per unit of GDP). These three factors, with the addition of a carbon intensity factor (carbon emission per unit of energy), can also be used to decompose factors underlying carbon emissions growth over time. When considering policies and other decisions relevant to the energy sector, stakeholders tend to focus on the energy intensity of the economy and the carbon intensity of energy, as population growth is generally outside the domain of energy policy and increasing GDP per capita is a common growth objective. However, population and GDP assumptions can vary between projections, affecting forecasts.

Energy intensity is tied to the efficiency of the capital stock (e.g., vehicles, buildings, industrial equipment), the composition of the economy (e.g., services versus manufacturing), and individual energy consumption patterns. Many policies affect these factors, ranging from the macro scale (e.g., industrial policy in more centrally-planned economies) to end-use products (e.g., efficiency standards for appliances and vehicles). Carbon intensity is largely determined by the carbon content of the fuels in the energy mix. Policies that directly affect carbon intensity include national or regional emissions standards and/or carbon pricing, efficiency standards, subsidies for non-CO₂ energy sources, and – conversely – subsidies for fossil fuel consumption or production. We discuss the key drivers of regional energy consumption and CO₂ emissions below.

### 4.1 Factors driving regional energy consumption and emissions

Table 3 shows key factors underlying global and regional energy consumption in 2012. With more than half of global population, Asia-Pacific contributes a larger share than any region in absolute terms of GDP (36 percent), energy consumption (41 percent), and CO₂ emissions (45 percent). However, Asia-Pacific, Africa, and Latin America are well behind OECD Americas, Europe/Eurasia and the Middle East in terms of GDP per capita and energy consumption per
OECD Americas far exceeds all other regions in GDP per capita and energy consumption per capita, both roughly 70 percent higher than the next region, Europe and Eurasia. The Asia-Pacific region is the world’s most carbon-intensive, largely due to a heavy reliance on energy-intensive manufacturing and coal-fired electricity.

Industrialized economies such as those in OECD Americas, Europe and Eurasia, and the Middle East display roughly similar carbon intensity figures. In Latin America and especially Africa, substantial portions of the population lack access to modern energy services, and a large share of the energy that is consumed is provided by hydro and traditional biomass, leading to a relatively low carbon intensity of energy. Africa and Latin America together consume only 11 percent of the world’s energy despite being home to 22 percent of its population. Table 5 shows the same factors for 2040 based on the IEA New Policies Scenario.

### 4.1.2 Regional demographic trends

Population growth assumptions are presented in IEA, U.S. EIA and OPEC outlooks. These assumptions are similar across outlooks, rising from seven billion in 2012 to nearly nine billion by 2040, in line with the 2013 “medium-variant” projection by the United Nations Population Division (UNDP) (2013). The UN projections also include low-, high- and constant-fertility scenarios, in which world population projections in 2040 range from 8.3 to 9.8 billion. However, none of the scenarios examined here base their projections on these variations.

According to the outlooks examined here, more than 90 percent of the two billion in additional population comes from developing countries, mostly non-OECD Asia and Africa. Africa shows both the highest absolute population growth and the fastest growth rate, adding 700 to 900 million people from 2012 to 2040, or 66 to 84 percent growth. In absolute terms, non-OECD Asia will have the second-largest population growth, adding around 700 million people, mostly in India and other developing countries outside China. India is likely to surpass China as the world’s most populous country by around 2030, when China’s population is projected to plateau. Population in the Middle East grows at the second highest rate in percentage terms, increasing by nearly 50 percent by 2040, though its global share of population remains steady. At the other extreme, Europe/Eurasia and Japan are projected to see population declines of two to five percent and 10 to 11 percent, respectively. In the Americas, population growth across outlooks is in the range of 22 to 26 percent from 2012 to 2040.

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3 The “medium-variant” scenario assumes fertility rates in different countries move towards the global average level.

4 These figures show the range of projections from all of the outlooks examined here, not the projections from any specific outlook. We follow the same convention throughout this paper unless otherwise noted.
as biomass is treated as a zero net estimates for do not include non energy bunkers. in the IEA WEO2014.

Notes:

Data source: IEA (2014f). For notes, see following table.

## Table 4: Current (2012) regional distribution of key energy drivers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>World</th>
<th>OECD Americas</th>
<th>Latin America</th>
<th>Europe and Eurasia</th>
<th>Africa</th>
<th>Middle East</th>
<th>Asia Pacific</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population (million)</td>
<td>7,042</td>
<td>488 (7%)</td>
<td>468 (7%)</td>
<td>907 (13%)</td>
<td>1,083</td>
<td>213 (3%)</td>
<td>3,883</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP ($2013 trillion at PPP)</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>20 (24%)</td>
<td>5 (6%)</td>
<td>22 (26%)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3 (4%)</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary energy consumption (qBtu)</td>
<td>530</td>
<td>104 (20%)</td>
<td>24 (5%)</td>
<td>117 (22%)</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>27 (5%)</td>
<td>215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CO₂ emissions (billion metric tonnes)</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>6 (19%)</td>
<td>1 (4%)</td>
<td>6 (20%)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2 (3%)</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP/population ($1,000/person)</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>41 (19%)</td>
<td>11 (4%)</td>
<td>24 (20%)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>15 (3%)</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Energy/GDP (1,000 Btu/dollar)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5 (19%)</td>
<td>5 (4%)</td>
<td>5 (20%)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9 (3%)</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Energy/population (million Btu/person)</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>213 (20%)</td>
<td>52 (5%)</td>
<td>129 (22%)</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>127 (5%)</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CO₂ emissions/energy (million metric tonnes/qBtu)</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>59 (20%)</td>
<td>47 (5%)</td>
<td>55 (22%)</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>62 (5%)</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Table 5: Potential future (2040) regional distribution of key energy drivers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>World</th>
<th>OECD Americas</th>
<th>Latin America</th>
<th>Europe and Eurasia</th>
<th>Africa</th>
<th>Middle East</th>
<th>Asia Pacific</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population (million)</td>
<td>9,004</td>
<td>594 (7%)</td>
<td>581 (6%)</td>
<td>930 (10%)</td>
<td>1,998</td>
<td>313 (22%)</td>
<td>4,587</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP ($2013 trillion at PPP)</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>37 (17%)</td>
<td>13 (6%)</td>
<td>39 (18%)</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>8 (6%)</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary energy consumption (qBtu)</td>
<td>726</td>
<td>112 (15%)</td>
<td>39 (5%)</td>
<td>122 (17%)</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>46 (7%)</td>
<td>334</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CO₂ emissions (billion metric tonnes)</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>5 (14%)</td>
<td>2 (4%)</td>
<td>6 (15%)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2 (5%)</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP/population ($1,000/person)</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>63 (14%)</td>
<td>22 (4%)</td>
<td>41 (15%)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>27 (7%)</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Energy/GDP (1,000 Btu/dollar)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3 (14%)</td>
<td>3 (4%)</td>
<td>3 (15%)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5 (5%)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Energy/population (million Btu/person)</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>188 (15%)</td>
<td>67 (5%)</td>
<td>131 (7%)</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>146 (7%)</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CO₂ emissions/energy (million metric tonnes/qBtu)</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>47 (20%)</td>
<td>42 (5%)</td>
<td>46 (22%)</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>54 (5%)</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Notes: 1. Europe and Eurasia includes OECD Europe and Eastern Europe/Eurasia. Asia Pacific includes OECD Asia Oceania and non-OECD Asia, all based on IEA regional definitions. Other regional groupings are as defined in the IEA WEO2014. 2. Regional sums do not exactly equal world totals because only the latter includes oil transport bunkers. The ratios in the bottom four rows are calculated from the values in the first four rows. Primary energy data include non-marketed energy such as traditional biomass. Some sources such as the U.S. EIA and BP do not include non-marketed energy. As a result, IEA primary energy and energy intensity estimates for Africa and non-OECD Asia are notably higher than sources that do not include non-marketed energy. This also leads IEA estimates for carbon intensity (CO₂/energy) for Africa and non-OECD Asia to be lower relative to the U.S. EIA, as biomass is treated as a zero net-CO₂-emissions fuel.
Along with population growth, migration patterns are an important demographic factor for energy consumption projections. One major trend over the projection period is urbanization. In most projections, the global share of population living in urban areas will rise from roughly 50 percent in 2010 to more than 60 percent by 2040, with the most rapid transitions in non-OECD Asia and Africa. This trend may result in noticeably higher per capita energy consumption in these regions, as urban households tend to consume more energy than those in rural regions (ExxonMobil, 2015).

### 4.1.3 Regional GDP growth

Most outlooks assume that world GDP (in purchasing power parity, or PPP terms) will grow at an average rate of 3.4 to 3.6 percent per year between 2012 and 2040, totaling 130 to 170 percent growth over that period. ExxonMobil’s economic assumptions are substantially lower than other outlooks at roughly 3 percent per year, resulting in total GDP in 2040 roughly 25 percent below forecasts from the IEA or U.S. EIA (Shell does not provide GDP assumptions).

The IEA and U.S. EIA project that non-OECD regions will contribute over three quarters of global economic growth through 2040, with more than half of that growth coming from non-OECD Asia. Under all of these projections, China leads the way in absolute GDP growth, accounting for nearly 30 percent of global GDP growth over the projection period. According to the IEA and U.S. EIA, China’s economy will reach 23 to 24 percent of global GDP by 2040, far exceeding each of the three broad OECD regions (OECD Americas, OECD Europe and OECD Asia/Oceania). Under ExxonMobil’s projection, China grows more slowly, accounting for roughly 20 percent of global GDP in 2040.

Rates of GDP growth are also strongest in Asia, with India surpassing China in terms of annual GDP growth sometime between 2020 and 2030, varying modestly between projections. Average annual growth rates range from 5.7 to 6.1 percent in India compared with 5.0 to 5.7 percent in China. Growth in OECD Europe and OECD Asia/Oceania continues along recent trend lines, growing more slowly than other regions at 1.6 to 1.8 percent per year. Between these two regional extremes, annual GDP growth rates are in the range of 4.1 to 4.7 percent for Africa, 3.1 to 3.3 percent for Latin America, and 2.2 to 2.6 for OECD Americas. A wider range of estimates emerges for Eastern Europe/Eurasia (2.5 to 3.8 percent) and the Middle East (2.2 to 3.6 percent).

Per capita GDP roughly doubles globally over the projection period, with the fastest rates of growth in Asia-Pacific (particularly China and India) and Africa. However, GDP per capita in these regions remains low relative to OECD nations, with Asia-Pacific nations averaging roughly one-third the level in OECD Americas, and Africa averaging just 11 percent of OECD Americas GDP per capita in 2040.
Importantly, the long-term economic assumptions made in these outlooks tend to assume steady growth, and do not anticipate recessions, wars, or other events that can dramatically alter economic trends. These uncertainties are typically addressed through broad high/low growth scenarios in some projections, though unexpected shifts in economic and technological trends can have large implications on energy demand projections, as we discussed in Section 3.

### 4.1.4 Regional energy consumption

With the exceptions of OPEC and Shell, all outlooks examined here make regional projections for primary energy consumption. Under all projections other than the IEA 450 Scenario, 75 to 90 percent of global energy consumption growth occurs in the East (a regional grouping we create that includes all of Asia-Oceania, the Middle East and Africa) due to its rapid economic and population growth. Asia-Oceania contributes the bulk of this new demand, accounting for 60 to 70 percent of total global consumption growth, while the Middle East and Africa cumulatively account for 20 to 30 percent. In the West (the rest of the world), the majority of growth comes from the Americas, with Europe and Eurasia expected to experience flat (or in ExxonMobil’s case, negative) growth. Under the IEA 450 Scenario, global energy consumption rises slowly, with consumption growing in the East and declining in the West.

### 4.1.5 Energy intensity and energy efficiency

Energy intensity can be measured either in energy consumption per unit of economic output (energy/GDP) or energy consumption per capita (energy/population). Energy use per GDP has declined substantially over time, and the IEA, U.S. EIA and ExxonMobil project this trend to accelerate. As shown in Table 4 and Table 5, global energy intensity (GDP in 2013 US dollars, PPP terms) falls from about 6,000 Btu/$ in 2012 to 3,000 Btu/$ in 2040 under the IEA New Policies Scenario.\(^5\) At around 2 percent per year, this rate of decline is roughly twice as rapid as previous decades (IEA, 2014f; U.S. EIA, 2013b). The U.S. EIA and ExxonMobil project similar declines in global energy intensity, though regional forecasts vary. Under all scenarios, the Asia-Pacific region will see the sharpest decline in energy intensity, bringing it roughly in line with most other regions by 2040. Latin America and the Middle East show slower declines in energy intensity, with the Middle East displaying the highest energy use per GDP in 2012 and 2040.

\(^5\) Notably, estimates of energy consumption per unit of GDP can vary substantially depending on whether they are measured in PPP terms or in market exchange rate (MER) terms. When measured in MER terms, energy intensity tends to be higher, and regional variations tend to become larger. For example, using the U.S. EIA’s IEO 2013, energy intensity for Asia-Pacific in 2012 is over 12,000 Btu/$ in MER terms, significantly higher than the world average; while the number is 7,000 Btu/$ on a PPP basis, much closer to the world average.
The IEA and U.S. EIA provide projections on energy consumption per capita, which grows in most regions except under the IEA 450 Scenario. Growth is led by Asia-Pacific and Latin America, while the Middle East sees slight to moderate growth. In all IEA and U.S. EIA projections, energy consumption per capita falls in OECD Americas, though it still consumes substantially more energy per person than any other region in 2040. Projections diverge for Africa and Europe/Eurasia, with per capita consumption remaining roughly flat in the IEA New Policies Scenario, but growing moderately in the U.S. EIA Reference Case.

### 4.1.6 Carbon intensity

Carbon intensity, measured as CO₂ emissions per unit of energy consumption, can be calculated from IEA, U.S. EIA and ExxonMobil projections. Under all these scenarios, carbon intensity decreases in all regions between 2012 and 2040. The main drivers for reductions in carbon intensity are policies supporting non-emitting fuels (i.e. renewables and nuclear) and natural gas relative to more carbon-intensive fuels, as well as the adoption of other low-carbon technologies such as carbon capture and storage. The IEA New Policies Scenario and ExxonMobil project global carbon intensity to decline at an annual rate of 0.4 to 0.5 percent, while the IEA Current Policies Scenario and the U.S. EIA Reference Case projects a much slower pace of decline at roughly 0.1 to 0.2 percent per year. Under the IEA 450 Scenario, global carbon intensity falls at a rate of more than 2 percent per year.

On a related note, carbon intensity can vary substantially depending on whether non-marketed biomass is included. For example, the IEA and U.S. EIA respectively estimate that Africa emitted 36 and 74 million metric tonnes of CO₂ per qBTU of energy consumption in 2012. This difference is due to the U.S. EIA’s exclusion of non-marketed biomass in primary energy consumption, substantially reducing the denominator in a CO₂/qBTU calculation. If non-marketed biomass is included in primary energy, Latin America and Africa are the least carbon-intensive economies both now and in the future under IEA and ExxonMobil projections.

### 4.2 Implications for energy trade

Regional trends in energy trade are shifting due to changing consumption patterns and supply sources (Figure 7). In recent years, the most notable change in energy supply is increased oil and gas production in North America, particularly the United States. These new supplies, coupled with almost flat consumption growth, has decreased net imports of crude oil and petroleum products in the United States from more than 10 mb/d during most of the 2000’s to 5 mb/d in 2014 (U.S. EIA, 2015g). By the end of the projection period, North America is a net exporter of coal and natural gas under all IEA scenarios. However, the United States still imports roughly six
mb/d of crude oil under the IEA New Policies Scenario in 2040. The United States is already a major exporter of refined petroleum products such as diesel and gasoline, and a small amount of crude oil exports had also become a reality as of early 2016.

**Figure 7: Shifting energy trade balances, 1990, 2012, and 2040**

Despite the potential re-emergence of the United States as a net energy exporter, the Middle East and Russia/Caspian region will continue to be the leading exporters of oil and gas. Due to Russia’s central role in interregional gas trade, recent conflicts in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine have raised concern about security of gas supply. Gas-importing countries in Europe and Asia are likely to seek supply diversification, including new pipelines and LNG supplies, though they will likely remain reliant on natural gas supplies from Russia.

Latin America and Africa are also net exporters of fossil fuels. Latin America sees a substantial increase in oil exports in all IEA scenarios, mainly due to rising oil output from Brazil’s pre-salt fields (i.e., found below the salt layer), though investment in these fields is likely to slow if oil prices remain around their 2014 to 2015 levels. Africa’s contribution to interregional trade is likely to remain fairly flat over the projection period due to domestic economic development and rising energy demand.

OECD Europe will continue to be a major energy importer, and Asia-Pacific will increasingly dominate global energy imports. Total Asia-Pacific energy imports nearly double over
the 2012-2040 period, with roughly two-thirds of this growth coming from China and India. For OECD Europe, projected energy imports in 2040 are similar to current levels, but the fuel composition of those imports will likely change. As Figure 7 shows, oil imports to OECD Europe are on a path to decrease as a result of enhanced vehicle efficiency, while natural gas imports are likely to increase due to fuel-switching in power generation and other sectors.

5. The global energy mix

This section discusses the evolution of and projections for the global fuel mix. Table 6 summarizes the past, current, and projected future shares of fossil fuels, nuclear energy and renewables in thirty-year intervals. Over the projection period, the global energy portfolio changes slowly due to the massive scale and long-lived capital investments involved in the energy system.

Table 6: Fuel shares of global primary energy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years/Scenarios</th>
<th>Coal</th>
<th>Oil</th>
<th>Natural gas</th>
<th>Total fossil</th>
<th>Nuclear</th>
<th>Renewables</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1950 (incl. non-market energy)a</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980 (incl. non-market energy)b</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010 (incl. non-market energy)b</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2040</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>cer</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IEA Current Policiesc</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IEA New Policiesc</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IEA 450c</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ExxonMobil</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPECc</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shell Mountainsc</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shell Oceansc</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010 (only marketed energy)g</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>89%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2035 BPc</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2040 U.S. EIAc</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data for historical baseline year

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years/Scenarios</th>
<th>Coal</th>
<th>Oil</th>
<th>Natural gas</th>
<th>Total fossil</th>
<th>Nuclear</th>
<th>Renewables</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2012 (incl. non-market energy)b</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012 (only marketed energy)g</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Notes: Oil includes crude and natural gas liquids, but not biofuels, which are included in Renewables. Sums of individual fossil fuels may not equal totals shown due to rounding.

One important indicator is the overall fossil fuel share of the energy mix. From 1950 to 1980, the share of fossil fuels increased rapidly from 64 to 85 percent as global industrialization spurred increased use of fossil fuels and a resulting smaller share of hydropower and non-marketed traditional biomass in the fuel mix. The fossil fuel share declined to 81 percent from 1980-2010,
eroded largely by the rise of nuclear energy. Over the next 25-30 years, environmental goals and to some degree energy security concerns are poised to drive the world towards greater use of low-carbon energy (i.e. renewables and nuclear), thereby reducing the share of fossil fuels to 70-80 percent under most of the scenarios (including non-marketed energy). Projected changes in the share of fossil energy hinge largely on the expected ambition of climate policies. On the lowest end, the IEA 450 Scenario projects that the fossil fuel share falls to 59 percent by 2040. We briefly discuss the major trends for each fuel below.

5.1 Fuel shares

5.1.1 Coal share

Coal’s share in the primary energy mix decreased sharply between 1950 and 1980, due to faster growth of oil, natural gas, and nuclear energy. With rapid development in China and other Asian economies from 1980 to 2010, coal grew more rapidly than any other fuel in absolute terms, stabilizing its share around 28 percent by 2010. Over the next thirty years, coal’s share is projected to remain roughly flat or decrease, depending largely on national and regional climate policies. Under the IEA 450 Scenario and ExxonMobil’s outlook, which both include a substantial cost on carbon emissions, coal’s share of the mix falls below 20 percent. Under business-as-usual scenarios (the IEA Current Policies Scenario, OPEC Reference Case and U.S. EIA Reference Case), coal’s share remains in the 27 to 31 percent range.

5.1.2 Oil share

Oil became the leading global fuel between 1950 to 1980 as the world rapidly industrialized and automobiles gained widespread popularity, rising from 19 percent of the mix in 1950 to 43 percent in 1980. As high oil prices in the late 1970s and 1980s spurred increased efficiency in automobiles and oil fell out of favor for electricity generation, its share fell to 32 percent by 2010. Nonetheless, oil maintains its top position in primary energy consumption thanks to its 93 percent share of total energy demand for transportation (IEA, 2014f).

Looking forward, most outlooks project a modest decline in oil’s share of the fuel mix, though in absolute terms oil demand sees robust growth under projections other than the IEA 450 Scenario. Oil becomes even more highly concentrated in the transportation and petrochemicals sectors, and almost all demand growth comes from developing countries. In developed economies,

---

6 Note that the share of fossil fuels is larger in outlooks that exclude non-marketed energy. For example, the IEA estimates the fossil fuel share to be 82 percent in 2012, while BP estimates 90 percent.
oil demand growth is flat or negative, primarily due to more stringent vehicle fuel economy standards and continued fuel switching to lower-cost and cleaner fuels in the industrial sector.

Another useful lens for examining trends in oil is through consumption in the transportation sector. Because of its heavy reliance on a single fuel, transportation is more vulnerable to supply disruptions and price shocks than other sectors. This lack of diversity continues under most projections, with oil providing roughly 85 to 90 percent of transportation energy supply in 2040. Under the IEA 450 Scenario, petroleum falls to 63 percent, displaced by electricity, biofuels, and to a lesser extent natural gas and hydrogen.

### 5.1.3 Natural gas share

Natural gas is the only fossil fuel whose share of the mix has steadily grown from 1950 to 2010, and growth continues under all scenarios over the next thirty years. The largest demand increase continues to come from the power sector, where natural gas’ relatively high efficiency, low emissions of CO₂ and other pollutants, and low capital costs help it displace coal and oil. However, natural gas also competes with zero-carbon sources such as nuclear and renewable sources, resulting in a lower share for natural gas in the IEA 450 scenario. Natural gas is poised to overtake coal in OECD nations as the leading fuel for power generation around 2025, while its share of the market grows more slowly in non-OECD nations.

### 5.1.4 Nuclear share

Nuclear power emerged as a major energy technology in the second half of the twentieth century, adding diversity to the fuel mix and providing an important zero-emission baseload power source. The share of nuclear power in the overall energy mix rose from zero in 1950 to 6 percent by 2010. However, concerns over accidents, waste management, and weapons proliferation have limited deployment, exacerbated in recent years by the Fukushima-Daiichi disaster in 2011. Nonetheless, nuclear energy is projected to increase its share in the global mix under most scenarios, especially those assuming ambitious climate policies. The majority of growth in nuclear power generation is projected to come from Asia-Pacific, particularly China.

### 5.1.5 Renewables share

We define renewables to include power generation sources – hydro, biomass, wind, solar, and geothermal – as well as biofuels and traditional biomass or waste fuels. As noted above, some outlooks include non-marketed biomass (i.e., the IEA, ExxonMobil, OPEC and Shell), while others do not (i.e., the U.S. EIA and BP). The inclusion of non-marketed biomass adds a substantial share of total energy consumption to the renewables category. For example, the IEA estimates that
renewables accounted for 13 percent of total energy demand in 2012, whereas BP, which does not include non-marketed biomass, estimates just four percent (Table 6).

While accounting methods vary, all projections are bullish on renewables, projecting them to be the fastest-growing fuel in the power sector and the largest contributor to capacity additions. However, growth in electricity generation is led by coal and gas under some projections due to lower capacity factors for certain renewable sources.

5.2 Carbon dioxide emissions

Figure 8 shows historical and projected CO₂ emissions from a range of outlooks and scenarios. Primarily due to different policy assumptions, global emissions in 2040 vary by over 25 billion metric tonnes of CO₂. At the high end are business-as-usual scenarios, which assume no new climate policies. At the low end is the IEA 450 Scenario, which assumes the most ambitious climate policies. In the middle range are the IEA New Policies Scenario, ExxonMobil, and Shell Mountains. In both Shell Scenarios, CO₂ emissions rise until 2030, then fall as renewables begin to meet incremental demand.


The Reference Approach is a standardized “top-down” approach for CO₂ emission estimation developed by the IPCC. The IEA also uses a “Sectoral Approach” to estimate CO₂ emissions. For a detailed explanation of these approaches, see IEA (2014a).
In all cases other than the IEA 450 Scenario, emissions growth comes entirely from the East, while emissions in the West remain flat or decline slightly (Figure 9). Most scenarios project that at the end of the projection period, more than 60 percent of global CO₂ emissions will come from the East, with non-OECD Asia accounting for roughly 80 percent of those emissions. In percentage terms, CO₂ emissions in Africa grow the fastest, though absolute emissions there remain small relative to regions with more developed economies. The next fastest rates of emissions growth come from non-OECD Asia and the Middle East. For the West, emissions are likely to remain flat without additional climate policies, and decline under the IEA New Policies Scenario, 450 Scenario, and ExxonMobil’s projection. Only under the IEA 450 Scenario do both the East and West see substantial reductions in CO₂ emissions.

![Figure 9: CO₂ emissions growth shifts almost entirely to the East](image)


To better understand the implications of these projections for climate change, we can relate them to the Fifth Assessment Report from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), released in 2014. To avoid the worst effects of climate change, almost all governments have agreed to attempt to limit global average temperature increase to 2°C compared to pre-industrial levels, which corresponds to CO₂-equivalent (CO₂-e) concentrations of around 450 parts-per-million (ppm) by 2100. While the IEA 450 Scenario aligns with this target, the other projections examined here are associated with higher global average temperature increases in the range 2.5°C or greater, and 3.5°C or greater for emissions that do not peak within the next few decades.
In 2014, several major new policies were announced, including the United States’ Clean Power Plan, the European Union’s 2030 framework for climate and energy policies, and new government action in China to address climate change. These policies, if implemented as planned, would lead to lower future CO₂ emissions than business-as-usual predictions.

6. Electricity

Electricity is projected to be the fastest-growing delivered energy form, with consumption growing under all projections and in all regions from 2012 to 2040, ranging from 54 percent growth under the IEA 450 Scenario to 94 percent growth under the IEA Current Policies Scenario. The growth in global electricity demand is dominated by the East, particularly Asia-Pacific, which in 1990 generated just one-fifth of the world’s electricity. Between 2012 and 2040, Asia-Pacific countries increase power generation by more than all other regions combined, and account for roughly half of global power generation under all IEA and U.S. EIA scenarios by 2040. Figure 10 shows the growth of electricity generation in the East and West under all three IEA Scenarios, along with the mix of fuels.

![Figure 10: Electricity consumption projections by fuel type](image)

Data source: IEA (2014f).

6.1 Coal fired electricity

Electricity generation is the leading use of coal, and projections for its use vary substantially depending on future climate policies. Under the IEA 450 Scenario, global coal-fired power is roughly 50 percent lower in 2040 than in 2012. Under scenarios with no policy changes (i.e., U.S.)
EIA Reference Case and IEA Current Policies Scenario), coal-fired generation grows 65 to 93 percent above 2012 levels by 2040. Falling roughly in the middle is the IEA New Policies Scenario, which projects 33 percent growth in coal-fired electricity. Because of rapid overall electricity consumption growth, coal’s share of the electricity fuel mix declines globally under all scenarios.

Under most projections, coal-fired power generation declines in the West (see Figure 11). However, growth in the East, led by non-OECD Asian nations, swamps these reductions, rising by nearly 70 percent relative to 2012 under the IEA New Policies Scenario. During the first portion of the projection period, China leads this growth, but as its coal consumption begins to plateau, other developing Asian nations become the major contributors to coal consumption growth.

**Figure 11: Global coal consumption projections**

![Figure 11: Global coal consumption projections](image)


Non-OECD Asian coal producers, led by China, produce far more coal than any other region, expanding their share of global production under various IEA scenarios from 62 percent in 2012 to between 65 and 68 percent in 2040. Production in OECD Asia Oceania more than doubles under the IEA New Policies Scenario and grows by over 50 percent under the New Policies Scenario, with substantial growth coming from Australia. Coal production in OECD Americas declines by over 25 percent by 2040, and production in OECD Europe falls by more than 80 percent under the IEA New Policies Scenario.

While coal production predominately occurs in the regions where coal is consumed, international coal trade is expanding, growing by roughly 11 percent between 2011 and 2013 (World
Coal Association, 2015), and is estimated to further increase by 40 percent from 2012 to 2040 in the IEA New Policies Scenario. This expansion in global coal trade mainly results from Asian countries’ increasing import needs of coal to cover domestic demand.

### 6.2 Natural gas fired electricity

Global natural gas consumption for electricity generation grows under all scenarios through 2040, ranging from over 80 percent growth under the IEA New Policies Scenario and U.S. EIA Reference Case to 13 percent under the IEA 450 Scenario. As with other fuels for electric power, absolute growth is led by Asia-Pacific, where natural gas consumption for electricity more than doubles under all scenarios, including the IEA 450 scenario.

As a share of the global electricity fuel mix, natural gas grows from 22 percent in 2012 to 25 percent in 2040 under most IEA and U.S. EIA forecasts, but falls to 16 percent of the mix under the IEA 450 Scenario, displaced by zero-carbon fuels. However, regional trends vary under different scenarios. In the Americas, Europe and Eurasia, and the Middle East, natural gas consumption grows in absolute terms and as a share of the fuel mix under most projections, but loses market share in the IEA 450 Scenario, displaced by nuclear and renewables. In Asia-Pacific, natural gas remains roughly flat at 13 percent of the fuel mix under most scenarios, but grows to 15 percent under the 450 Scenario, displacing coal-fired generation.

### 6.3 Renewable electric power

Renewable electricity technologies such as wind and solar have become more cost competitive with traditional sources, and are projected to grow at a faster percentage rate than any other fuel source, though from a relatively small base. Policy factors, especially climate policies, will play a major role in the deployment of these technologies, a point highlighted by the variation in renewable capacity and generation estimates between scenarios (and discussed in the box below). In the IEA New Policies Scenario, 450 Scenario, and Shell’s New Lens Scenario, non-hydro renewables (including biomass) contribute more additional power generation than any other fuel source over the projection period. Under the IEA Current Policies Scenario and U.S. EIA Reference Case, non-hydro renewables grow more slowly. Growth in non-hydro renewables is led by Asia-Pacific, followed by OECD Americas and Europe/Eurasia, with more modest additions in the Middle East, Latin America, and Africa.

Hydropower is also projected to grow, but its share of the power mix continues to decline from 20 percent in 1990 to 17 percent in 2012, declining to between 13 and 16 percent by 2040 under most scenarios. Only under the IEA 450 scenario does hydropower’s share of the mix grow, returning to 20 percent by 2040 (see Figure 12).
Policy support for renewables

Renewable electricity growth in the European Union, United States, and China, among other regions, has benefited from financial incentives and mandates designed to spur deployment. As costs for these technologies decrease, it is unclear whether policies will continue to heavily support renewables, or if they will diminish as targets are reached and public budgets tighten.

In Europe, subsidies in nations such as Germany and Spain have recently been scaled back due to high public expenditures. However, the European Commission in 2014 issued a new target of 27 percent renewable electricity by 2030, up from 20 percent in 2020. These policies indicate that the EU will continue to lead most other regions in terms of renewable power as a share of consumption. Under the IEA New Policies Scenario, subsidies for renewables in the EU grow from roughly $60 billion in 2013 to more than $75 billion by 2025, then begin to decline as technologies such as onshore wind become more competitive.

In the United States, recent administrative action under the Clean Air Act aims to reduce CO\textsubscript{2} emissions from the power sector by about 30 percent in 2030 relative to 2005. While these efforts will likely spur additional investment in renewables, much of the CO\textsubscript{2} reductions will be met by fuel switching from coal to natural gas, increased efficiency, and demand response programs. At the end of 2015, the US federal production tax credit for wind power generation was extended to the end of 2019 and solar investment tax credit until the end of 2021, with a step-down over time. Many renewable portfolio standards (RPS), an important support for renewables in many US states, aim to reach certain levels of deployment by 2020 or 2025. In most states, new legislation will be required to further advance renewables deployment through RPS.

In China, the National Action Plan for the Prevention and Control of Air Pollution announced in September 2013 aims to reduce coal consumption in the power generation and industrial sectors, replacing it with natural gas, nuclear, and renewables. The plan seeks to increase the share of renewables in the primary energy mix from 10 percent in 2013 to 20 percent by 2030. Under the IEA New Policies Scenario, renewables subsidies in China, led by support for wind and hydropower, grow from roughly $10 billion in 2013 to roughly $30 billion by 2030, then decrease slightly.
Data sources: Historical data from IEA (2014f); projections from U.S. EIA (2013b) and IEA (2014f).

### 6.4 Nuclear power

Forecasts for nuclear power generation vary widely. On the low end, the IEA Current Policies Scenario projects growth of 57 percent from 2012 to 2040, while more bullish projections from the U.S. EIA see growth of 125 percent over the same period. Nuclear grows most quickly under the IEA 450 Scenario, which projects growth of 161 percent.

Under all scenarios, growth is dominated by Asia-Pacific, which adds more than twice as much new nuclear generation as the rest of the world combined. China accounts for more than half of this growth under all scenarios from the IEA and U.S. EIA. Growth in Europe and Eurasia varies widely between projections, with the U.S. EIA Reference Case projecting an increase of 552 TWh in 2040 relative to 2012, the IEA New Policies Scenarios projecting an increase of just 84 TWh, and the IEA Current Policies Scenario forecasting a decrease of 111 TWh. A similarly wide range exists for projections in North America, highlighting the uncertainties and challenges facing the nuclear industry in developed economies (see box). Nuclear power growth is modest in all other regions.
Nuclear power in the OECD: challenges ahead

Nuclear power, along with hydroelectricity, has been the leading source of non-CO₂ electricity across developed economies for decades. But these fleets are aging, and many face substantial economic and political challenges. The replacement options for retiring nuclear plants include: (1) fossil sources which would increase carbon dioxide emissions; (2) renewable sources which face challenges of intermittency and cost; and (3) new nuclear power, which also faces high costs, especially in developed economies.

In Japan, the 2011 Fukushima-Daiichi disaster led to a nationwide shutdown of nuclear stations, spurring increased generation from natural gas, coal, and oil-based power units. Many nuclear stations are scheduled to resume operations, though only two reactors out of the nation’s 48 have been approved for restart as of early 2015 (World Nuclear Association, 2015). In 2002, the Japanese government set a target for power generation from nuclear at 40 percent by 2017. However, the IEA New Policies Scenario projects Japan’s nuclear fleet to contribute 20 percent of the nation’s power in 2020, and just 21 percent by 2040.

In OECD Europe, nuclear faces challenges associated with an aging fleet and political opposition, particularly in Germany, where nuclear is scheduled to be phased out by 2022. Substantial variation exists between U.S. EIA, which projects nuclear power in OECD Europe increasing by nearly 25 percent from 2012 to 2040, and the IEA, which forecasts nuclear generation declining by 10 percent under the New Policies Scenario and by 26 percent under the Current Policies Scenario. Only under the 450 Scenario does the IEA project a growing level of nuclear power generation in OECD Europe, rising by roughly 8 percent from 2012 to 2040.

In North America, renewables and natural gas have put pressure on an aging nuclear fleet from two directions. Because wind tends to be most productive in the evening, prices during off-peak hours in certain regions may fall into low or even negative territory due to the negligible variable operating costs of wind power, thereby reducing revenues for base load generators such as nuclear. At the same time, low-cost natural gas has begun competing with nuclear to provide base load power, and several nuclear units have shut down in recent years. Under most projections, nuclear’s share of the North American power mix falls by two to four percent in 2040 relative to 2012. Nuclear’s share grows in North America only under the IEA 450 Scenario, gaining an additional three percent of the mix by 2040.

Growth in nuclear power is projected to come from China and other Asian nations such as South Korea and India, where construction costs are lower and construction timetables are shorter than those seen in the OECD (IEA, 2014f). In its 2014 World Energy Outlook, the IEA argues that most new nuclear generation is likely to come from nations and regions where power prices are strictly regulated or where government-backed monopolies dominate the wholesale power market.
7. Petroleum and other liquids

7.1 Liquids demand

Global demand for petroleum and other liquids grows at a slower rate than previous decades, but absolute growth is similar to the 1980 to 2010 period (see Table 7). Over the next 30 years, demand growth comes entirely from the East. Under most projections, the East overtakes the West around 2020 and continues to grow substantially through 2040. Only under the IEA’s 450 Scenario does global liquids consumption decrease over the projection period, declining in the West by nearly 30 percent and growing in the East by roughly 18 percent above 2010 levels by 2040.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years/Scenarios</th>
<th>Liquids consumption (million barrels of oil-equivalent per day)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>World</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950*</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980*</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010*</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2035 BPc</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2040</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IEA Current Policiesd</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IEA New Policiesd</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IEA 450d</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ExxonMobilc</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. EICA</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shell Mountainsc</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shell Oceansc</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPECc</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data for historical baseline year

| 2012b         | 90 | 48 | 42 |

Notes: The East includes Asia Pacific, Africa and the Middle East, while West is the rest of the world. Biofuels are included in liquids, with projected biofuels consumption for 2040 varying by source: approximately 2.9 MBOED for the U.S. EIA; 3.6, 4.6, and 8.7 MBOED for IEA’s Current Policies, New Policies, and 450 scenarios, respectively; 3.7 MBOED for ExxonMobil; 3.2 MBOED for OPEC; 4.8 and 3.4 MBOED for Shell’s Mountains and Oceans Scenarios, respectively; and 2.7 MBOED for BP in 2035. United Nations Statistical Office (1976). U1980, 2010, and 2012 historical data from BP (2014). cBP (2015). dProjections from IEA (2014c) for East and West do not include bunker fuels. We allocate bunker fuels to East and West based on the proportion of global consumption in the relevant year. eExxonMobil (2015). fU.S. EIA (2013b). gShell (2013) using conversion factor of 0.488 mbpd per EJ/year. hOPEC (2014).

Liquids consumption shifts decisively towards the East under all projections with perhaps the exception of the IEA 450 Scenario (Figure 13). Demand growth is led by Asia-Pacific, where consumption increases by 12 to 20 mb/d by 2040 relative to 2010. Consumption in the Middle East also grows rapidly, adding between 2.2 and 5.5 mb/d by 2040. In Africa, projections vary widely.
reflecting uncertainty over population growth, economic growth, and urbanization. Africa liquids consumption in 2040 relative to 2010 ranges from one mb/d higher under U.S. EIA projections to 5.8 mb/d more under ExxonMobil's projections.

**Figure 13: Liquids consumption growth shifts decisively to the East**

![Graph showing liquids consumption growth shifts decisively to the East](image)


### 7.2 Regional liquids supply

Global oil demand enjoys robust growth under every scenario except the IEA 450 Scenario. This demand is met by a range of suppliers, with OPEC gaining market share relative to the 40 percent it controlled in 2013, in all but one scenario. As Figure 14 and Table 8 show, however, there is substantial divergence between projections over where incremental production may come from, both across and within OPEC and non-OPEC groups of countries. Under scenarios with high oil prices such as the U.S. EIA’s High Oil Price Case and the IEA’s Current Policies Scenario, non-OPEC producers provide a relatively large share of new supplies. In the IEA’s New Policies Scenario and OPEC’s Reference Case, OPEC producers modestly expand their market share through 2040. Under OPEC’s higher and lower economic growth scenarios, OPEC nations increase or reduce their production to balance global supply and demand. We note, however, that these projections were produced prior to the full extent of the recent oil price collapse, and the response of OPEC Member Countries and non-OPEC oil suppliers to it.
North America has led global oil production growth in recent years, with the United States adding some four mb/d since 2008. However, lower oil prices in 2014 and 2015 have reduced rig counts in the United States, and posed challenges for high-cost oil sands producers in Canada. In the U.S. EIA’s Reference Case, the IEA’s Current Policies Scenario, and the BP Reference Case, North American growth continues through the end of the projection period due to sustained growth from Canadian oil sands (production in the United States plateaus and begins to slowly decline).

Uncertainty surrounds production in Mexico in the wake of recent energy sector reforms, with production growing to nearly four mb/d by 2040 under the U.S. EIA’s Reference Case, and falling to less than two mb/d under the OPEC Reference Case.

Production from the Middle East has also grown substantially in recent years, adding two mb/d to the market above 2008 levels, and closer to four mb/d above 2009, when cuts were made in response to the global economic slowdown. Production growth has been led by Saudi Arabia, Iraq, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar, which together have supplied an additional 2.7 mb/d since 2008. Western sanctions against Iran related to its nuclear program contributed to a reduction in production of more than 0.8 mb/d over this period, though the agreement on Iran’s nuclear program is likely to reverse this trend. Looking forward, production in the Middle East grows under all forecasts other than the IEA’s 450 Scenario, with OPEC member countries in the Middle East...
adding between six mb/d and 21 mb/d by 2040 relative to 2013. This wide range of projections primarily reflects uncertainty over demand, as oil reserves in the Middle East are large. However, political instability and the threat from terrorist groups both have the potential to disrupt supplies.

Russia and Caspian Sea nations increase production modestly under most projections, with Russia continuing to be one of the world’s largest oil producers, growing by 0.8 mb/d to 2.1 mb/d from 2013 to 2040. However, uncertainty exists due to U.S.-led sanctions against Russia in response to the crisis in Eastern Ukraine, low oil prices, and other issues. Production in Kazakhstan grows by roughly one mb/d to two mb/d under various OPEC and U.S. EIA scenarios, though uncertainty also exists over production at the supergiant Kashagan field.

Oil production in Latin America has slowed in recent years, primarily due to a decline of 0.6 mb/d in Venezuelan production since 2008. Most projections show Latin American OPEC production (which is dominated by Venezuela but also includes Ecuador) increasing modestly by 2040. Brazil, on the other hand, is projected to increase production by between 1.8 mb/d and 5.5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country/region</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2025</th>
<th>2040</th>
<th>2013-2040 growth</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>10.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico and Chile</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Sea</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other OECD</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>11.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caspian area</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other non-OPEC</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>10.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total non-OPEC</td>
<td>54.2</td>
<td>55.9</td>
<td>65.3</td>
<td>58.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East OPEC</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>34.5</td>
<td>31.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Africa OPEC</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Africa OPEC</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South America OPEC</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total OPEC</td>
<td>36.0</td>
<td>27.1</td>
<td>48.7</td>
<td>33.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total world</td>
<td>90.1</td>
<td>90.1</td>
<td>104.6</td>
<td>94.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

mb/d, with the wide range reflecting uncertainty over the prospects of its deepwater pre-salt fields. A final point of interest comes from Argentina, which adds nearly 0.2 mb/d in tight oil and NGLs by 2030.

In Africa, production grows, but uncertainty exists around a range of issues. In North Africa, production in recent years has declined in OPEC Member Countries Libya and Algeria. Most projections show production from North Africa increasing, but uncertainty remains. In OPEC Member Countries Angola and Nigeria, production has been relatively steady over the past decade, and projections show combined growth of 0.8 mb/d to 3.2 mb/d by 2040.

Production in Europe continues to fall under all forecasts, due primarily to declines in aging North Sea fields. Interest in shale resources in the United Kingdom, Poland, and parts of Eastern Europe has the potential to increase energy production, but development remains uncertain.

8. Natural gas

Under all scenarios, natural gas production and consumption grow at a faster percentage rate than any other fossil fuel. As Table 9 shows, the West experiences consistent growth and remains the leading consumer of natural gas in 2040, while percentage growth rates are higher in the East. Asia-Pacific leads growth, followed by the Middle East and North America. Projections for the Europe and Eurasia region vary widely, ranging from 5 bcf/d to 35 bcf/d in additional consumption by 2040. Only under the IEA 450 Scenario does natural gas consumption remain flat or decline in most developed economies, though it continues to grow in non-OECD nations.

8.1 Regional gas consumption

Under all scenarios, including the IEA 450 Scenario, gas consumption in Asia-Pacific grows throughout the projection period. ExxonMobil makes the most bullish projection for this region, with 102 bcf/d higher consumption in 2040 than in 2010. More conservative forecasts come from the U.S. EIA and IEA New Policies Scenario, which respectively project additional consumption of 70 and 72 bcf/day by 2040 relative to 2010.

---

8 Ranges for Asia Pacific from U.S. EIA Reference Case (66 Tcf), which uses 2012 as a baseline and ExxonMobil Reference Case (101 Tcf), which uses 2010 as a baseline. Ranges for the Middle East from the IEA NPS (29 Tcf), the IEA CPS (38 Tcf), and BP Reference Case (38 Tcf). All use 2012 as a baseline, but the BP projection extends only to 2035. Ranges for North America from BP Reference Case (19 Tcf) and ExxonMobil Reference Case. Ranges for EU from ExxonMobil Reference Case (5 Tcf) and the IEA CPS (40 Tcf).
Table 9: Natural gas consumption

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years/Scenarios</th>
<th>Natural gas consumption (billion cubic feet per day)</th>
<th>World</th>
<th>Growth over previous period</th>
<th>West</th>
<th>Growth over previous period</th>
<th>East</th>
<th>Growth over previous period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1950a</td>
<td></td>
<td>18</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980b</td>
<td></td>
<td>138</td>
<td>120 (667%)</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>108 (600%)</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12 (11,900%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010b</td>
<td></td>
<td>308</td>
<td>170 (123%)</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>80 (63%)</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>90 (750%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2035 BPc</td>
<td></td>
<td>490</td>
<td>182 (59%)</td>
<td>266</td>
<td>59 (29%)</td>
<td>224</td>
<td>123 (122%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2040d</td>
<td></td>
<td>504</td>
<td>213 (73%)</td>
<td>309</td>
<td>81 (41%)</td>
<td>251</td>
<td>132 (140%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IEA Current Policiesd</td>
<td></td>
<td>469</td>
<td>179 (61%)</td>
<td>284</td>
<td>59 (30%)</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>118 (125%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IEA New Policiesd</td>
<td></td>
<td>368</td>
<td>77 (26%)</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>-11 (-5%)</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>83 (88%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IEA 450d</td>
<td></td>
<td>547</td>
<td>211 (63%)</td>
<td>281</td>
<td>59 (27%)</td>
<td>266</td>
<td>152 (134%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ExxonMobilf</td>
<td></td>
<td>507</td>
<td>197 (64%)</td>
<td>287</td>
<td>80 (38%)</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>118 (115%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. EIAg</td>
<td></td>
<td>635</td>
<td>313 (97%)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shell Mountainsg</td>
<td></td>
<td>526</td>
<td>204 (63%)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shell Oceansg</td>
<td></td>
<td>587</td>
<td>295 (101%)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data for historical baseline year

| 2012 | 319 | - | 207 | - | 112 | - |


In percentage terms (and under some scenarios absolute terms), the region with the second most robust growth is the Middle East. Due in part to concerns over rising domestic oil consumption, oil exporting nations have increasingly turned to natural gas resources to generate electricity, leaving more oil available for export. Under the most bullish projection (BP), Middle East natural gas consumption more than doubles by 2035.

In North America, continuing large-scale production of shale gas coupled with increased demand from the electricity and manufacturing sectors leads to substantial consumption growth. Most projections are in relative agreement on the scale of this expansion, with consumption increasing by between 41 and 44 percent (30 to 37 bcfd) over 2010 levels by 2040. Areas of uncertainty for North American natural gas consumption center on the implementation of CO₂ regulations for power plants, the extent of increased natural gas demand for bulk chemicals and other manufacturing, and the scale of LNG exports over the coming decades.

In Europe and Eurasia, consumption grows by four to 30 percent (five to 35 bcfd) under most scenarios, and the drivers of that growth vary substantially between projections. In the
ExxonMobil Outlook, which other than the IEA 450 Scenario makes the most bearish forecast, the EU and Russia both grow steadily, while a slightly smaller share of growth is attributable to Eastern Europe and Eurasia. Under the more bullish IEA Current Policies and New Policies Scenarios, growth is led by Eastern Europe and Eurasia, while gas consumption in the EU and especially Russia grows more slowly.

Natural gas consumption in Africa and Latin America is more modest, with Africa adding between 14 and 18 bcf/d and Latin America adding between 11 and 20 bcf/day over the projection period. ExxonMobil and the IEA are most bullish about natural gas consumption growth in these regions, while the U.S. EIA projects slower growth.

8.2 Natural gas supply

Proved natural gas reserves are dominated by Russia, Iran, and Qatar, which respectively control 17 to 25\(^9\), 18, and 13 percent of global proven reserves (BP, 2014; U.S. EIA, 2013b). However, the United States is currently the world’s largest natural gas producer, with recent growth led by shale and other tight formations. Between 2005 and 2012, global natural gas production grew by 21 percent, led by the United States, Qatar, and China (BP, 2014).

Looking forward, the U.S. EIA projects production growth through 2040 to be led by Russia, the United States, Iran, and Qatar (U.S. EIA, 2013b). Projections show growth in the United States coming exclusively from shale and other tight formations, while growth in Russia and the Middle East mostly comes from conventional reservoirs (though shale gas contributes some additional supplies in Russia). Under all IEA Scenarios, production from non-OECD Asia roughly doubles, though the region still produces less gas than the United States, Russia, or the Middle East. Unconventional gas also may provide substantial new supplies in other regions, but projections vary widely (see box).

\(^9\) BP estimates that Russia holds 17 percent of proved reserves, and the U.S. EIA estimates 25 percent.
Unconventional natural gas: moving beyond North America?

Natural gas production from shale and other tight formations has reshaped the North American natural gas market and affected global LNG trade flows. Through 2015, investments in shale development in China, Argentina, South Africa, Eastern Europe, and other regions have yet to yield large-scale natural gas or oil production. Lower oil prices will likely slow development of shale oil resources in Argentina and Russia, but natural gas prices remain relatively high in Europe and Asia, and several governments are actively promoting shale gas development.

BP projects roughly six percent of global natural gas production to come from shale gas outside North America by 2035, with most production coming from Europe/Eurasia (including Russia) and China. In its Reference Case, the U.S. EIA projects that shale gas, tight gas, and coalbed methane resources outside of North America will account for roughly 17 percent of global natural gas production by 2040, though they note that uncertainty remains high.

In China, home to the largest estimated shale gas resources, a variety of market reforms and incentives have been put in place to spur shale gas development. International oil companies, along with Chinese state-owned enterprises, have invested in the Sichuan basin, but production from shale formations was just 0.25 bcf/d in 2014 (U.S. EIA, 2015d). While the demand for gas is strong, several issues including lack of access to pipelines and water resources, limited incentives for state-owned enterprises, and limited geological data suggest that shale production in China is unlikely to approach the levels seen in the United States for the foreseeable future (Sandalow, Wu, Yang, Hove, & Lin, 2014; Tian, Wang, Krupnick, & Liu, 2014). However, coalbed methane resources in China are substantial (Liu et al., 2009), and may become a large supply source in coming years.

In Europe, political opposition has halted or slowed shale gas development in nations such as France and Germany. In the United Kingdom, exploration and testing has also met substantial political opposition, though the current government appears intent on continued exploration. In Eastern Europe, concerns over dependence on imported Russian gas supplies has led to substantial interest in developing shale resources in nations such as Poland, where over 60 exploratory shale wells have been drilled, as well as in Romania (Shale Gas Europe, 2015). However, early testing has not led to substantial production, and several major international oil and gas companies scaled back their investments during 2015.

Recent liberalization of the energy sector in Mexico has spurred interest in shale formations, and the U.S. EIA projects that unconventional gas production in Mexico will grow from zero today to nearly 5.5 bcf/d in 2040. Other nations with substantial shale resources include Algeria, Australia, and South Africa. Testing and exploration is currently underway in each of these nations, though future production remains uncertain.
8.3 *International natural gas trade*

The annexation of Crimea by Russia and conflict in Eastern Ukraine has increased concerns in Europe and Asia over reliance on Russian energy supplies, particularly through natural gas pipelines. These regions are heavily reliant on imported natural gas from Russia and other Caspian countries, and this reliance is projected to increase. From 2012 to 2040, the IEA New Policies Scenario projects reliance on imported gas to rise from 45 percent to 66 percent in OECD Europe, from 27 to 39 percent in China, from 31 to 45 percent India, and from 12 to 40 percent in other Asian nations. Figure 15 illustrates similar projections from ExxonMobil.

![Figure 15: Regional natural gas demand by supply type, 2010, 2025, and 2040](image)

Figure from ExxonMobil (2015). Used with permission.

LNG trade is projected to grow rapidly in the coming decades, increasing market flexibility and speeding the decline of oil-linked contracts. Still, the IEA New Policies Scenario forecasts that interregional gas trade through pipelines grows from 38 bcf/d in 2012 to 58 bcf/d in 2040, even while LNG trade grows from 14 bcf/d to 52 bcf/d. Highlighting the continued importance of pipeline trade was the May 2014 agreement for China to import some 3.5 bcf/d from Russia by the
mid-2020s, with prices estimated in the $10/MBtu range (IEA, 2014f). At the same time, global LNG capacity is growing substantially, with major new investments in the United States, East Africa, Australia, and Papa New Guinea (OPEC, 2014).

In the United States, the U.S. EIA’s 2014 Annual Energy Outlook projects that LNG exports could reach as high as 14 bcf/d by 2040 under a High Oil and Gas Resource Case. Under its Reference Case, LNG exports are roughly 10 bcf/d, or roughly 10 percent of domestic production in 2040 (U.S. EIA, 2014). As additional LNG supplies come online, demand in OECD Asia, a major market for LNG imports, appears to be easing. The IEA New Policies Scenario projects that Japanese natural gas consumption will fall back to pre-Fukushima levels by 2020, though demand growth from other Asian economies is projected to more than make up for any slide in demand from Japan. Japanese spot LNG prices averaged above $16/MBtu in 2012 and 2013 (BP, 2014) but has since declined, reaching below $8/MBtu in late 2015 (Reuters, 2016).

9. Conclusion

Global energy markets have undergone substantial unexpected changes in recent years, with other major trends continuing unabated. First, global energy demand continues to grow at a robust pace, and although the rate of growth slows under most projections, absolute demand for energy increases from 2015 to 2040 as much or more than it has over previous 30-year periods. Second, global energy demand continues to shift eastward. Although China’s energy consumption growth slows in all projections, India, Indonesia, and other Southeast Asian nations drive continued demand growth in the region.

Unconventional oil and gas production in North America has grown more rapidly than anticipated, with important implications for global oil and natural gas markets. At the same time, energy demand growth in China in 2014 was far more modest than most projections had anticipated, easing the pressure on global oil supplies and contributing to the 2014 collapse in oil prices. Costs for renewable electricity led by wind and solar have fallen more quickly than expected, making them cost-competitive with other fuels sources in some regions. These renewable sources will continue to grow rapidly under most projections.

Finally, CO₂ emissions from the energy system continue to grow under most projections, leading to atmospheric concentrations of CO₂ consistent with average global temperature increases in the range of close to 3°C or more unless more stringent policies are adopted or there are major zero-carbon technological breakthroughs. In contrast with these projections is the recent agreement among almost all countries to strengthen the response to climate change, with a goal of holding the increase in global average temperature to 2°C or less through nationally-determined policies.
10. References

OPEC. (2014). *World Oil Outlook*. Vienna, Austria: OPEC.